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FEATURE
ARTICLE
*This speech is reprintedwith permissionfrom the Federal
Trade Commission.

Report from the Bureau of
Competition
Prepared Remarks of Molly S. Boast,
Acting Director Bureau of
Competition, Federal Trade Commission, Before the American Bar Association Antitrust Section
Spring Meeting 2001, Washington,
D.C., March 29, 2001
I. Introduction
I appreciate the opportunity to present this overview of developments at the Bureau of Competition over
the last twelve months.' I have the distinct honor of
succeeding Rich Parker, who presented the Bureau's
report last year. As illustrated by the Bureau's record
during his tenure, I have large shoes to fill (or, in his case,
cowboy boots). Fortunately, Rich left a Bureau
with a highly talented and dedicated staff focused on
serving the public interest.
Once again, the Bureau had a busy and productive
year. We filed four preliminary injunction actions in
merger cases, and had favorable outcomes in three of
them - a win, and two transactions abandoned before
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trial - and a temporary setback in Heinz/Beechnut, which
is now before the D.C. Circuit, the court having granted
an injunction pending appeal. In addition, we
negotiated successful resolutions to identified competitive problems in 20 merger cases in which he Commission
accepted consent agreements. In seven other matters the
parties abandoned the merger before Commission action.
In nonmerger actions, we obtained a $100 million consent
judgment in Mylan, a pharmaceutical monopolization
case, and the Commission entered into eight consent
agreements.
One increasingly important aspect of our work is
the number of litigated cases. Some have criticized the
enforcement agencies for writing themselves out of the
process of making antitrust law by generally accepting
consent agreements rather than litigating the tough cases.
If that charge was ever true, it is not so today. Under the
guidance and leadership of my predecessors, Bill Baer
and Rich Parker, the Bureau's litigation skills have become stronger and deeper. This year we were put to an
unprecedented challenge, preparing for litigation in
several cases, including conducting two simultaneous
trials - Swedish Match and Heinz - the first time the agency
has done that since the enactment of the Hart-ScottRodino Act. In the past year alone, the Commission has
been involved in a number of important litigated decisions, including the Seventh Circuit decision in Toys R Us,
the Ninth Circuit decision in CaliforniaDental Association,
and the District Court decisions in Swedish Match, Heinz,
and Mylan. So much for the charge that the Commission
has forsaken litigation as a vehicle for elucidating antitrust law.
I will start this overview with a brief discussion of
the recent HSR reform legislation and our ongoing efforts
to reduce second request burdens, and then move on to
recent merger litigation, merger remedies, and the principal areas of merger and nonmerger enforcement at the
FTC during the past year - energy, pharmaceuticals and
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health care, consumer goods, and media mergers. I will
try to offer some thoughts on factors that led us not to
bring certain cases, and then finish with a brief note
about international cooperation.

II. HSR Reform
In December, 2000, Congress passed legislation
amending the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. The FTC and the
Justice Department worked with the leadership of the
Senate and House Judiciary Committees, business and
industry groups, the ABA Antitrust Section, and other
members of the private bar to update the Act, which had
been untouched for a quarter century. Among other
things, the legislation made several changes to reporting
thresholds that will substantially reduce the number of
reportable transactions, probably by as much as 50 percent. The most significant change is the increase in the
size-of-transaction threshold from $15 million to $50
million. In large part, this change adjusted for inflation
since HSR enactment twenty-five years ago. The legislation also eliminated the alternative 15 percent threshold.
Together, these changes mean that the new $50 million
threshold will be an absolute floor - no transaction resulting in an acquiring person holding less than $50 million
in assets or voting securities of an acquired person is
reportable.
Another statutory change was implemented to
capture some competitively significant transactions
previously not reportable. Transactions valued at greater
than $200 million are now reportable without regard to
the "size-of-person" threshold.2 This change addressed
the concern that some competitively significant firms,
particularly high-tech start-ups, may have few sales or
assets reflected in their financial statements, but an acquisition nonetheless may raise competitive concerns. Finally, the legislation requires adjustment of the size-oftransaction and size-of-person dollar thresholds each
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fiscal year, beginning with FY 2005, for changes in GNP
during the previous year.
While the number of filings will decrease, the
filing fees will increase. To make these changes revenueneutral, Congress implemented a tiered fee structure. A
$45,000 fee is retained for transactions valued at less than
$100 million; transactions of not less than $100 million
but less than $500 million now pay a filing fee of
$125,000; and transactions valued at $500 million or more
now pay a filing fee of $280,000.
The estimated 50 percent reduction in the number
of reportable transactions does not mean a commensurate reduction in the agency's workload. The bulk of the
Competition Bureau's resources have been devoted to the
relatively few transactions that appear to raise potentially
significant competitive concerns, and that will continue.
The greater number of nonreportable transactions do not
necessarily mean less expenditure of resources. Some of
these transactions will raise competitive problems, but
without the protection of HSR these matters will be more
resource intensive and time-consuming. It can be more
difficult to identify anticompetitive mergers without an
HSR filing, and the process of investigating and challenging nonreportable transactions that have been consummated can be demanding. To the extent the HSR reforms
do free up any resources from merger enforcement, those
resources are needed in the Commission's nonmerger
program, which has been understaffed for several years
during the crush of merger review.
The HSR statutory reforms and the interim rules
implementing the reforms took effect on February 1st.
The premerger staff also has proposed a number of other
rules changes, most of them ministerial, but some substantive, to streamline the premerger notification process
and make it less burdensome. The public comment period for these proposed rules ended on March 19, and
staff has begun analyzing the comments. The next round
of rulemaking will seek to convert the reporting of prod-
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uct information on the HSR notification form from the
old Standard Industrial Classification System to the
newer North American Industrial Classification System.
This proposed rule is expected to be on the public record
for comment soon, with an effective date of July 1, 2001.
The Premerger Office, under the leadership of
Assistant Director Marian Bruno, recognizes that outreach is critical to increasing transparency and reducing
burdens. The HSR portions of our website receive more
"hits" than any other parts of the Bureau's web pages.
There you can learn more than you can imagine (or
wanted to know) about everyday questions HSR practitioners face. The premerger staff continues its informal
brown bag lunches with HSR practitioners to elicit input
on needed changes and to provide guidance. This past
year the staff conducted over a dozen of these sessions
and gained extremely helpful input from practitioners.
Please contact us if you would like to participate

III. Second Request Process
The Hart-Scott-Rodino amendments contain
provisions requiring the agencies to conduct an evaluation of the second request process and enact internal
reforms within 120 days after the statute became law.
Last April, the Bureau adopted several reforms to improve the second request process, including improvements based on ideas received from the ABA Antitrust
Section and individual private practitioners. Several of
these reforms have been included in the FTC's Rules of
Practice. The reforms include:
the Assistant Director of Operations thoroughly reviews all proposed second requests to
eliminate unnecessary burdens before they are
sent to the parties;
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staff is instructed to convene a second request
conference with parties to a transaction within
five business days after the issuance of a second request unless otherwise agreed;
staff is instructed to respond to a request for
modification of a second request within five
business days after the request has been made;
and
the General Counsel serves as the arbiter in
disputes over modifications or compliance
with the second request and will decide any
appeal within ten business days.
For the past few months we have conducted an
internal evaluation of the second request process to
determine whether the April 2000 reforms have been
effective. All of the second requests issued after the
reforms have been reviewed, and my staff has spoken to
numerous private counsel involved in these investigations. We recently conducted a brown bag lunch in which
the merger staff heard from both corporate and law firm
counsel about the burdens of second requests. I am
currently evaluating a set of initiatives to help further
improve the second request process and reduce the
burdens imposed by that process. As always, we welcome the input of the Antitrust Section and practitioners
in general on these issues.

IV. Mergers
The Commission's competition activities in FY
2000 and thus far in FY 2001 reflect its continuing commitment to protect consumers from potentially
anticompetitive mergers. FY 2000 saw the continuation of
the merger wave. More than 4,900 merger notifications
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were filed during the year, the largest number ever. This
continued a ten-year trend in which the number of filings
more than tripled since 1991. The total value of reported
transactions in FY 2000 exceeded $3 trillion - more than a
tenfold increase over the past decade. Some of the largest
mergers in history were reviewed during FY 2000, including AOL/Time-Warner (over $100 billion), Glaxo
Welcome/SmithKline ($182 billion), Pfizer/Warner
Lambert ($90 billion), and BP/ARCO ($27 billion). Over
70 percent of the Commission's competition resources
were devoted to merger enforcement during the last
fiscal year, a level far above the historic average. The
merger workload has eased in recent weeks, but that
simply means that the Bureau is very busy rather than
extraordinarily busy.
A. Merger Litigation
The past year has seen substantial activity in
merger litigation. It began with our litigation to obtain a
preliminary injunction against the merger between BP
and ARCO which, as I describe below, was resolved with
a complete settlement. Since then we filed four other
preliminary injunction actions. Two of the cases (Swedish
Match/NationalTobacco and Heinz/BeechNut) were litigated, and the other two transactions (KrogerlWinn-Dixie
and Conso/McCall)were abandoned shortly after we
commenced litigation.
Swedish Match/National Tobacco
The agency successfully challenged the proposed
acquisition of the loose leaf chewing tobacco business of
National Tobacco Company, L.P., by Swedish Match
North America Inc. This acquisition would have combined the nation's largest and third-largest makers and
sellers of loose leaf chewing tobacco, giving Swedish
Match approximately 60 percent of sales and creating a
318
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market in which two firms would control 90 percent of
sales. The parties dropped the transaction after the district court issued a preliminary injunction.
Product market definition was one of the major
issues in this case. Defendants argued that moist snuff
and loose leaf chewing tobacco compete in the same
market. Although the district court found that the two
products are functionally interchangeable, and thus both
products were part of some broader market, 3 the court
also agreed with the FTC that the correct test for antitrust
purposes is whether the two products constrain each
other's prices.4 The court concluded that in this case they
did not. The court looked to both Brown Shoe criteria
(sensitivity to price changes, distinct prices, and industry
or public recognition)5 and the Merger Guidelines' hypothetical monopolist test in concluding that "substitution
to moist snuff is unlikely in the event of a price increase
in loose leaf tobacco."6 The court found it implausible
that loose leaf users would substitute premium moist
snuff in response to a ten-cent increase in the price of
loose leaf, because premium moist snuff would still be
much more expensive. The court rejected substitution to
price-value snuff as a significant constraint on loose leaf
prices both because of the small sales volume of pricevalue snuff and because price-value snuff is sold primarily by loose leaf firms. Consequently, the court found, a
loose leaf monopolist would lose only a small amount of
business to moist snuff, and would regain that lost business in sales of its other product.7
Defendants' attempt to rebut the Commission's
prima facie case relied on the argument that the industry
was declining, and that declining demand was a disincentive to increase price after the acquisition.8 But defendants failed to explain how consistently wide margins
and a steady increase in loose leaf prices had survived
the fiercely competitive environment they asserted. 9 The
court concluded that the industry exhibited oligopolistic
behavior stemming from high concentration in the mar-
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ket, and that the merger would increase the likelihood of
coordinated action by increasing concentration and
reducing the number of competitors. 10
Swedish Match is the first case, to our knowledge,
to ratify the differentiated product diversion theory,
articulated in Section 2.21 of the Merger Guidelines. The
court found "the weight of the evidence demonstrates
that a unilateral price increase by Swedish Match is likely
after the acquisition because it will eliminate one of
Swedish Match's primary direct competitors."" Under
the diversion theory, the court explained, "Swedish
Match will raise prices as long as the profit gained by the
higher prices of Swedish Match products in addition to
the profit diverted to National's brands is greater than
the profit lost through diversion to non-Swedish Match
2
brands."'
Finally, the court found that even assuming that
efficiencies were a viable defense in some cases, the
defense was inappropriate in a case in which the acquisition would result in such high market share and increased concentration. 3 The court also found it was
speculative whether any savings would be passed on to
consumers in the form of lower prices.' 4 The court enjoined the merger and the parties dropped the transaction.
Heinz/Beech-Nut
The FTC challenged Heinz's proposed acquisition
of Beech-Nut, a merger of the second and third largest
manufacturers of baby food. This market is critically
important to millions of consumers with infant children.
Most supermarkets carry only two brands of baby food,
and one of the brands almost invariably is Gerber, the
long-standing market leader. Thus, Heinz and Beech-Nut
were accustomed to fighting for the second slot on grocers' shelves. There was extensive record evidence of this
head-to-head competition as the merging firms sought to
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displace each other from existing accounts. While both
firms had traditional regional strongholds, both also
were fighting to increase their national presence. This
movement was reinforced by mergers of supermarkets
that did not have the same supplier for their second baby
food slot. These mergers often led to competition between Heinz and Beech-Nut for the post-merger consolidated account. The head-to-head competition for supermarket accounts resulted in very substantial price concessions to retailers and promotional programs directed to
consumers. The merger would put an end to this competition. This merger to duopoly raised very serious concerns that consumers would be harmed from higher
prices, less innovation, and less consumer choice.
Heinz and Beech-Nut defended the merger on
three principal grounds. First, they argued that because
Gerber is a dominant firm (if not a monopolist) that set
the market price, the merger would not result in higher
prices. Second, they argued that the merger would give
Heinz a national presence and a scale of operations
necessary to compete with Gerber. Third, they argued
that the merger would produce substantial efficiencies, in
large part by consolidating production into Heinz's
newer plant. Heinz argued that it would use its "value
pricing" strategy for the new, consolidated product line,
and thus consumers would receive Beech-Nut quality at
a new, lower price.
The district court denied a preliminary
injunction. 15 We believe the court erred on several
grounds, and we sought a stay pending appeal. In its
memorandum opinion granting the stay, the D.C. Circuit
stated that "Itihe FTC has demonstrated a substantial
probability of success on the merits."' 6 The Court noted
that the premerger HHI of 4775 and increase of 510
points "creates, by a wide margin, a presumption that the
merger will lessen competition at the retail level."' 7 The
Court also noted that "it is indisputable that the merger
will eliminate competition between the two merging
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parties at the wholesale level, where they are currently
the only competitors for what the district court described
as the 'second position on the supermarket shelves."" 8
The Court found none of the "usual rebuttals to a prima
facie case available here," because the district court found
that new entry is "difficult and improbable," and that
neither appellee is a "failing firm."19 As to the parties'
efficiencies defense, the Court stated that "[b]alanced
against the FTC's strong evidence that the merger will
lessen competition, appellees' claim, that post-merger
efficiencies will permit so much increased retail competition between the merged entity and Gerber as to outweigh any anticompetitive effects, is sufficiently uncertain to give the FTC a substantial probability of success
on the merits." 20 The Court concluded that, while
"appellees' efficiencies defense may yet carry the day,...
only the grant of interim relief will both afford this court
an opportunity to determine whether that should be the
case and protect the public interest in the event that it is
not."' 21 You can find our appellate briefs on the FTC
website.22 Oral argument on the appeal was on
February 12.
Kroger/Winn-Dixie
In this transaction, Kroger proposed to acquire 74
Winn-Dixie supermarkets in Texas and Oklahoma. About
half the stores are in metropolitan Fort Worth, where
Winn-Dixie and Kroger are the second- and third-largest
stores and together account for about 33 percent of all
supermarket sales. One of the interesting aspects of this
case was geographic market definition. Although Fort
Worth and Dallas both are within an area known as the
Metroplex, substantial evidence pointed to metropolitan
Fort Worth as a market economically and geographically
distinct from Dallas for supermarket consumers. This
market is highly concentrated, and certain towns outside
Fort Worth are even more highly concentrated. The
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parties also contended that their stores were not each
other's closest substitutes in the eyes of consumers. I
cannot address that contention in detail, because our
brief was filed under seal, but our analysis of the evidence indicated that, for a number of reasons, both unilateral and coordinated effects were likely from the
merger. The parties withdrew the transaction shortly
after the Commission filed for a preliminary injunction.
Conso/McCall
Our fourth preliminary injunction case involved
the proposed acquisition of McCall Pattern Company by
Conso International Corp., in the market for home sewing patterns. Conso, which owns the popular Simplicity
brand, is the leading firm in what is essentially a threefirm market. The acquisition would have left Conso in
control of nearly three-quarters of U.S. sales in this market. This transaction, too, was withdrawn shortly after
the Commission filed for a preliminary injunction.
B. Merger Remedies
The alternative to litigation, of course, is a negotiated settlement. The Bureau has given a lot of thought to
merger remedies in recent years, and that continues. This
is an extremely important aspect of merger enforcement,
because we have an obligation to restore competition as
closely as possible to premerger levels if a settlement is
the route we choose. Otherwise, we haven't adequately
protected competition and consumers.
In the mid-90s, the Bureau began to look back at
its remedy practices and found that some remedies were
not working as well as they should. The Bureau began to
focus more on ensuring that remedies would be effective.
This has been an evolving process. A formal divestiture
study, which was completed somewhat later, reinforced
the view that some kinds of remedy provisions tended to
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work better than others. We now hear criticisms that we
have gone too far - that our policies are too inflexible,
that they impose unnecessary burdens, and that it takes
too long to reach a resolution. Our preference for upfront
buyers under certain circumstances is particularly
singled out for criticism. I will address those criticisms,
but first will set out some introductory premises.
The first premise is that there are no entitlements
involved here. Much of the complaining about remedies
seems to stem from a sense of entitlement to the merger.
That is not where we begin the analysis. We begin from a
position of neutrality. We don't start with a presumption
in favor of the merger, but we don't start with a presumption against it either. Our task is to undertake an
objective but critical review of the merger, and see where
that takes us. We do not pursue a remedy out of some
calculus that "maybe we should see what we can do
about competition in this industry." Rather, we start with
a complete analysis of the merger's possible competitive
effects. Only after we have determined through investigation that the merger is likely to be anticompetitive do
we consider what to do about it. Of course, if the merger
does not raise competitive problems, the parties are right
- they are entitled to proceed with the merger. But that's
not the situation we face once we've found reason to
believe the merger will be anticompetitive. At that point,
there are no entitlements.
The second premise is that once we have determined that the merger is likely to be anticompetitive, we
have an obligation to seek an effective remedy. We have
two choices - either seek to enjoin the merger pending a
full trial, or seek a negotiated settlement. Thus, it is
important to recognize that discussions about remedy in
a particular case are held in the context of our determination that we will seek to enjoin the transaction unless a
remedy can be negotiated that resolves our competitive
concerns with sufficient protections for consumers. The
negotiated remedy is, by definition, settlement of what
otherwise would be a lawsuit. Again, there are no entitleLoyola Consumer Law Review
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ments. In contrast to private settlements that often involve some degree of compromise, the Commission's
negotiating posture is not likely to compromise consumer
interests. There is no way to "split the baby," as is often
the case in private monetary settlements. Thus, there
should not be an expectation that the Commission will be
satisfied with less than a fully effective remedy.
The third premise is that consumers should not
bear the risk of an inadequate or ineffective remedy. A
merger is forever (at least relatively speaking), and therefore so is the harm caused by an incomplete remedy.
Thus, even assuming arguendo there are efficiencies that
are foregone while settlement negotiations take place or
while the parties look for a buyer up front, we also have
to consider the potential long-term costs of a remedy that
doesn't work. Consumers should not bear the risk of a
cheap, hurried settlement.
So what are we looking for when we consider
remedies? If the parties are willing to divest an ongoing
stand-alone business, where there are prospective and
interested buyers capable of restoring competition, the
Commission often accepts a post-order divestiture, typically within 4-6 months. If the parties are not willing to
divest an ongoing, stand-alone business - and frequently
they are not willing - the Bureau has a preference for
upfront buyers to help ensure that the asset package will
be sufficient, in the right hands, to restore competition,
and will be saleable. In other cases, we are willing to
consider remedies other than divestiture to solve competitive problems, so long as they provide an effective
cure. The Commission accepted non-divestiture remedies
within the last year in cases such as Koch-Entergy and
DTE-MichCon. I will discuss those two cases a little later.
The merger remedy process works best with
dedicated staff who can focus on the issue of remedies
and order violations. Fortunately, at the Commission we
have a talented and hardworking Compliance Division
led by Dan Ducore, which focuses exclusively on these
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issues. The Compliance Division helps ensure that best
practices in negotiating, drafting and enforcing orders are
developed and followed across the Bureau. The Compliance Division staff has the best experience with what
works and what doesn't, and how to craft enforceable
orders. Their participation assures consistency of approach. We try hard to ensure that the merger investigation staff involves the Compliance Division staff as soon
as remedy questions arise. We strive for a seamless team
comprising those investigating the merger and those
negotiating a settlement.
Sometimes negotiated remedies don't work out
the way they were intended, and the Compliance Division has an enforcement role. Let me give you two recent
examples. Last week the Commission made final the
divestiture order involving RHI's 1999 acquisition of
Global Industries, which raised competitive problems in
two refractories markets for the steel industry. The case
was settled in late 1999, and RHI divested to an upfront
buyer, Resco Products, Inc., in early March 2000. Why
didn't the Commission make the order final earlier?
Although RHI completed the vast part of the divestiture
as required, disputes quickly arose between RHI, Resco,
and us about remaining obligations. RHI worked with
the Compliance Division and the Commission's monitor
trustee to resolve these problems. Ultimately, RHI and
Resco settled their dispute with an agreement that RHI
will perform certain additional obligations, and will pay
Resco $5 million. When the Commission made the order
final, it made certain modifications from the original
version, with RHI's consent, that conform the order to
the ultimate agreements between RHI and Resco, and
that specifically incorporate the settlement agreement
into the order. This means that the Commission can
require RHI to perform its settlement agreement obligations through an order enforcement action.
Another example of the Compliance Division's
order enforcement role is the case against Boston Scien-
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tific Corporation for an order violation.23 The case is
currently in litigation, so I will not talk about it in detail,
but you should read the complaint. In 1995, Boston
Scientific sought to acquire Cardiovascular Imaging
Systems ("CVIS"), and the Commission went to court to
enjoin the transaction. Before the preliminary injunction
hearing, Boston Scientific entered into a consent order 24
with the Commission, pursuant to which it was required
to license certain technology to Hewlett-Packard Company to remedy the proposed merger's anticompetitive
effects in the intravascular ultrasound ("IVUS") catheter
market. Boston Scientific entered into a licensing agreement with Hewlett-Packard, which was approved by the
Commission, and which imposed certain obligations on
Boston Scientific. The Commission withdrew its court
challenge, and Boston Scientific acquired CVIS (and
Scimed, another firm poised to enter the IVUS catheter
market).
Boston Scientific licensed much of the CVIS patent
portfolio, but not all, and disputes arose between
Hewlett-Packard and Boston Scientific as to the completeness of Boston Scientific's compliance with its obligations. When the Compliance Division became aware of
these disputes, we conducted an extensive investigation
of Boston Scientific's compliance. We were not able to
achieve any resolution of those disagreements, however,
and the Commission sued Boston Scientific for civil
penalties and other relief. The complaint alleges five
violations of our order. First, Boston Scientific failed to
license one of the patents required to be licensed under
the Order. Counts 2-4 allege that Boston Scientific failed
to provide information to Hewlett Packard on a timely
basis concerning three new IVUS catheters introduced by
Boston Scientific, as required by the licensing agreement.
Count 5 alleges that Boston Scientific refused to supply
its Discovery catheter to Hewlett- Packard pursuant to
the interim supply provisions of the Order and the agreement. Our case against Boston Scientific provides a clear
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lesson of the dangers in failing to comply with the
Commission's final orders.

V. Review of Enforcement Actions
While the Commission's antitrust actions involved
a broad range of markets, this overview will focus on
four industry segments that are particularly close to the
consumer: energy, pharmaceuticals; consumer goods;
and media mergers.
A. Energy
Energy industries have long been a priority at the
FTC. With energy prices now at the forefront of
everyone's thinking, and with deregulatory measures
being introduced to additional parts of the industry,
careful antitrust scrutiny is crucial. In the last year the
Bureau has been busy with petroleum mergers, transactions in the natural gas and electricity industries, and
gasoline pricing investigations.
Petroleum
BP/ARCO. The big petroleum case of the last year was
the challenge to BP Amoco's acquisition of Atlantic
Richfield. The filing of a preliminary injunction action
was noted in our report from the Bureau at last year's
Spring Meeting, but the matter had not yet been heard. In
a nutshell, the merger proposed to combine the two
largest producers of crude oil on the North Slope of
Alaska (ANS), one of the largest sources of crude oil in
the free world. These firms were the two largest suppliers
of ANS crude oil to refineries in California and Washington, and the two most successful competitors in bidding
for exploration leases on the North Slope. In addition, the
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combined firm would have had a dominant interest in
the oil pipeline and storage facilities that serve the crude
oil marketing center in Cushing, Oklahoma, the delivery
point specified by the New York Mercantile Exchange for
physical delivery of the world's most heavily traded
petroleum futures contracts.
One of the interesting issues in this case was the
evidence that, contrary to the conventional wisdom that
crude oil trades in a worldwide market in which no
single firm has market power, BP in fact was exercising
market power in the supply of crude oil to certain West
Coast refiners. BP's market power was demonstrated by
its use of price discrimination, including efforts to reduce
the supply of crude oil on the West Coast by selling ANS
crude to Asia, the U.S. Gulf Coast, or the U.S. Mid-continent. Another interesting issue, rather unique in a merger
case, was that the concern about BP's potential market
power over the infrastructure in Cushing was not simply
the effect on the price for use of the infrastructure, but
also the potential that control of the infrastructure could
be used strategically to manipulate physical deliveries to
benefit BP's trading positions on the market and result in
artificially high futures prices.
The district court did not have occasion to decide
these issues, because the case was settled. Under the
terms of the settlement, BP was required to make a "clean
sweep" divestiture of all the assets involved in ARCO's
crude oil production on Alaska's North Slope. BP also
agreed to divestitures of facilities in Cushing. In essence,
the settlement provided all the relief that successful
litigation would have. Press reports valued the Alaska
divestiture to Phillips Petroleum at an estimated $7
billion, the largest dollar-value divestiture ever. This
remedy ensured that upstream sources of supply remained competitive and that downstream refineries,
retailers and millions of consumers on the West Coast, as
well as the owners of the natural resource rights on the
North Slope (the United States Government and the State
of Alaska), would benefit from that competition.
Volume 13, Number 4 2001
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Natural Gas
Natural gas is another tremendously important
energy industry, because gas is the fuel of choice for
many industrial and residential users. Mergers in this
industry are particularly interesting and analytically
challenging because of the range of issues they present.
They can raise not only horizontal concerns, but also
transportation bottleneck issues that can affect electricity
markets. Natural gas is used in electric power generation,
and it is often the fuel of choice for new electric generating plants, particularly self-generation and co-generation
facilities. Natural gas can also compete head-to-head
with electricity for certain residential and commercial
applications. Natural gas thus helps keep electricity
markets competitive. The acquisition of gas pipeline
assets by an electric generating company or a local distribution utility may enable the acquirer to raise rivals'
costs. An acquisition of upstream natural gas assets by an
electric or gas local distribution utility also may, in some
circumstances, enable the utility to evade rate regulation
by paying inflated input costs which are then passed on
to utility consumers. A merger also may eliminate some
degree of direct cross-fuel competition between gas and
electricity. Continuing consolidation in the industry
during the past year raised all of these competitive concerns.
DTE Energy/MichCon. A consent agreement involving
the proposed acquisition of MCN Energy Group by DTE
Energy Company is the most recent Commission action
in this area. DTE is the parent of Detroit Edison Company, the largest electrical utility in Michigan. MCN is the
parent of Michigan Consolidated Gas ("MichCon"), a
major natural gas utility in Michigan. The Edison and
MichCon service areas overlap in several counties in
southeast Michigan, including Detroit and most of the
surrounding metropolitan areas. With the exception of
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Detroit, Edison is the sole distributor of electricity in the
overlap area, and MichCon is the sole distributor of
natural gas. The merger raised several competitive issues.
First, the merger would enable DTE to raise input costs
for customers who want to use natural gas for self-generation or co-generation of electricity as an alternative to
being supplied by Edison. Natural gas is the fuel of
choice for such customers, and the evidence showed that
having this self- or co-generation alternative resulted in
lower prices and better service from Edison.
Second, within the city of Detroit, the municipallyowned Detroit Public Lighting Department ("PLD") is a
direct competitor of Edison for new non-residential
customers, and the PLD depends on MichCon for delivery of natural gas for its generating plant. After the
merger, the PLD would have to rely on its electricity
competitor for delivery of natural gas. Third, the merger
would eliminate the direct competition that exists between electricity and natural gas for certain commercial
and industrial applications such as powering air compressors, commercial cooking, and various process applications. MichCon had been actively seeking to switch
customers from electricity to natural gas for such applications. Edison would not have the same incentive to
promote such energy-saving conversions. This was the
first time the agency challenged an acquisition on the
basis of direct competition between electricity and gas for
end use applications.
The remedy for these competitive problems is
somewhat novel - the divestiture of an easement in the
MichCon natural gas distribution system to a third party
who would become an independent alternative supplier
of natural gas in the overlap area. The easement essentially gives the buyer unlimited capacity for use in serving customers who use natural gas for on-site generation.
The buyer is Exelon Energy Company, the parent of
Commonwealth Edison, the utility that serves Chicago
and northern Illinois. Exelon already markets natural gas
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to buyers in southeastern Michigan and is the exclusive
Midwest distributor for Honeywell/Allied-Signal, one of
the leading producers of microturbines and distributed
generation equipment. Exelon therefore is well situated
to be a viable competitor to MichCon in the natural gas
market.
Entergy/Koch. A different set of concerns was presented
by Entergy Corporation's acquisition of a 50 percent
interest in the Gulf South Pipeline Company in a joint
venture transaction with Koch Industries. Competitive
concerns arose because the acquisition could facilitate the
evasion of utility rate regulation. Entergy operates gas
and electric utilities in areas of Louisiana and Mississippi,
where it has the exclusive right to sell and distribute.
Those utilities use Gulf South to transport natural gas to
their facilities. Entergy also has subsidiaries engaged in
the wholesale marketing and trading of natural gas and
electricity, in which Koch would acquire a 50 percent
interest in another part of the transaction. Although
Entergy's utility's rates are regulated, the utilities can,
subject to review, pass through increased natural gas
costs to their customers. The transaction would give
Entergy the ability to take advantage of this pass-through
provision by using its ownership interest in Gulf South to
pay inflated prices for gas and gas transportation, pass
through the higher costs to consumers, and share in the
higher profits earned by Gulf South. Although Entergy's
rates are subject to review, natural gas pricing is complex,
and some of the pricing is not transparent. Without close
monitoring, it would be difficult to determine whether
Entergy was paying a competitive price at any given
time. To protect consumers from thus paying higher
prices on their gas and electric utility bills, the FTC obtained a consent order that requires Entergy to implement an open, transparent process for its gas purchases,
so that regulators will be able to determine whether
Energy is paying inflating prices.
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El Paso/PG&E;El Paso/Coastal.Two acquisitions of
natural gas pipeline systems by El Paso Energy Corporation, from Pacific Gas & Electric and the Coastal Corporation, raised conventional horizontal concerns. In some
areas, El Paso and its merger partner were the only two
transportation options available to customers, and in
other areas they represented two of only three options.
The Commission obtained consent agreements in both
transactions to prevent competitive harm. El Paso is
required to divest interests in a total of 14 pipeline systems to firms that would operate the systems independently of El Paso and thus preserve competition in parts
of Florida, New York, Wisconsin, Indiana, New Mexico,
Texas, and producing areas in the Gulf of Mexico.
Gasoline Pricing Investigations
The Commission conducted two investigations of
gasoline pricing conduct, one on the West Coast and one
in the Midwest. The West Coast investigation was based
on complaints that retail gasoline prices in several western states have been persistently higher than they are in
other parts of the country, for no apparent reason. The
Midwest investigation focused on the price spike that
occurred in the spring and summer of 2000, resulting in
retail gasoline prices that were significantly higher than
in other areas. Chairman Pitofsky recently informed
members of Congress that the Midwest investigation did
not uncover any evidence of collusion among industry
members to restrict output or raise prices. A report to
Congress detailing the results of the investigation will be
issued in the near future. We have not yet taken any final
action with respect to the West Coast investigation.
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B. Pharmaceuticals and Health Care
The pharmaceutical industry has been another
priority for the Commission, for obvious reasons - high
drug prices are a big pocketbook issue for consumers and
businesses, and for government as well. The Commission's monitoring of the industry has resulted in several
recent merger and nonmerger enforcement actions.
Mylan. The Commission's monopolization case against
Mylan Laboratories, which was noted in last year's
report, was concluded with a record $100 million settlement - almost full recovery of the alleged $120 million in
ill-gotten gains. Mylan, the nation's second-largest generic drug manufacturer, and others were charged with
monopolization, attempted monopolization and conspiracy to eliminate much of Mylan's competition for
generic versions of two drugs used by millions of patients to treat anxiety, lorazepam and clorazepate. The
complaint alleged that Mylan tied up the key active
ingredients for these drugs. The conduct led to sudden
and huge price increases of up to three thousand percent.
The case was settled before trial with Mylan agreeing to
disgorge $100 million into a fund to compensate injured
consumers and state agencies. The $100 million judgment
was the largest to date for the Commission in a
Sectionl3(b) antitrust action.
This was a particularly appropriate case to bring
under Section 13(b): (1) the alleged illegal activity caused
significant, observable harm to an identifiable group of
consumers; (2) the Commission could measure the harm
with some degree of accuracy; (3) the benefit to the violator from violating the law far exceeded the cost to that
party of the remedies available in administrative litigation; and (4) the anticompetitive character of the conduct
was clear cut.
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CaliforniaDentalAssociation. Of course, we don't
always prevail when we litigate. Last September, the
Ninth Circuit rejected the Commission's challenge to
advertising restrictions imposed by the California Dental
Association. After the Supreme Court's 5-4 vote to remand for a more detailed examination of the record
under the rule of reason, the appeals court panel held
that the FTC had failed to prove that CDA's advertising
rules were anticompetitive. 25 In a statement issued along
with the Commission's order dismissing the case, three of
the Commissioners expressed their disagreement with
the panel's assessment of the evidentiary record, but
made it clear that nothing in the decision undermines the
Commission's basic approach to analysis of professional
association advertising restraints.26
Notwithstanding the disappointing final outcome,
the litigation of this matter was important. First, the
Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Commission's
jurisdiction over nonprofit associations whose activities
provide economic benefits to their for-profit members.
This ruling settled a significant issue that Supreme
Court's 1982 evenly divided opinion in the American
Medical Association case had left unresolved. In addition,
the Supreme Court's ruling clarified an important question regarding the contours of rule of reason analysis. The
Court squarely rejected the contentions of CDA that it
was necessary to do a so-called "full blown" analysis,
including a detailed definition of dental services markets
in California, and demonstration of market power. Thus,
the notion that horizontal restraints not coming within
the "per se" or "quick look" categories automatically fall
off the cliff into full blown, merger-type analysis was put
to rest. One further point about CaliforniaDental. Some
have suggested that the Supreme Court's decision represents a fundamental rejection of the government's general approach to horizontal restraints, in favor of a new,
more demanding standard of proof of anticompetitive
harm - one that will require demonstrable evidence of
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actual anticompetitive effects before a violation is found.
There is little to suggest the Court intended such a conclusion. As many have already noted, the decision seems
to have turned on the concern of the five members of the
majority that special issues relating to the professions
had not been adequately addressed.27 Outside that context, the rule of reason approach outlined in the
Commission's original decision seems appropriate. And
the recent Continental Airlines v. United Air Lines decision
- which applied an abbreviated rule of reason analysis to
condemn an agreement among competing airlines to
restrict the size of carry-on luggage - supports the view
that the courts are likely to apply the CaliforniaDental
decision in light of its professional trade association
context.2 8 After examining the nature of competition in
the industry, the court in Continental Airlines had no
difficulty in concluding that the restraint was likely
anticompetitive. The case shows that CaliforniaDental is
not as confining as some have suggested.
Before leaving the topic of anticompetitive conduct matters, let me make a point about the process of
our investigations. Periodically firms take the stall and
delay tactic, of refusing to comply with CIDs in
nonmerger investigations. This tactic is shortsighted
since the Commission is not reticent in requiring compliance with its investigational tools. During the investigation of The Hearst Corporation's acquisition of MediSpan, Inc., two witnesses from Hearst refused to answer
the most basic fact questions concerning an alleged
failure to submit documents required by item 4(c) of the
HSR form. (Notably, there had been no petition to quash
the subpoena when it was issued.) The witnesses asserted attorney-client and attorney work product privilege objections very broadly, to try to shield themselves
from any reasonable discovery. For example, the person
who certified the HSR notification would not even answer if she had read the form before signing it. The
Commission filed a subpoena enforcement petition in
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federal court to compel answers to our questions. The
petition was resolved prior to a court hearing, but the
point should be clear that the Commission takes its
processes seriously and will not hesitate to enforce its
discovery demands.
On the merger front, the Commission's activities
included enforcement actions involving two very large
transactions:
Glaxo WellcomelSmithKline Beecham. The merger of
Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham created the
world's largest research-based pharmaceutical company,
with an estimated market capitalization of $182 billion
and annual sales of $26 billion. The merger threatened
competition in numerous product markets in which the
companies have competing products either on the market
or in the developmental pipeline. The Commission secured a consent agreement that required divestitures in
nine markets, including antiemetics drugs used in chemotherapy to reduce the incidence of side effects, antibiotics, antiviral drugs for the treatment of herpes, chicken
pox and shingles, and antiviral drugs for the treatment of
cold sores. All of the divestitures were accomplished
within 10 business days after consummation of the
merger.
Pfizer/Warner-Lambert.The FTC's consent agreement in
Pfizer's $90 billion merger with Warner-Lambert similarly required divestitures in several major markets,
including (1) the $7 billion market for antidepressants
used to treat the 10 million Americans diagnosed with
depression each year; (2) the $270 million market for
drugs used to treat Alzheimer's disease; (3) a future
market estimated to be worth as much as $1 billion for
drugs that both companies were developing for the
treatment of solid tumor cancers diagnosed in more than
1.2 million Americans each year; and (4) the $150 million
market for over-the-counter treatments for head lice,
which are used to treat 8 to 12 million children each year.
Volume 13, Number 4 2001

Loyola Consumer Law Review

337

C. Consumer Goods
Toys "R" Us. The Commission's exclusionary conduct
case against Toys "R" Us was brought to a successful
conclusion when the Commission's decision and order
was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
Toys "R" Us, the nation's largest retailer of toys, was
charged with conduct aimed at curtailing the emerging
competition from low-price club stores. To stem this
competitive threat, Toys orchestrated an agreement
among toy manufacturers not to sell hot-selling toys to
the clubs, or to sell to them only on disadvantageous
terms. To facilitate this agreement, Toys acted as a
middleman, conveying assurances from one supplier to
another that they would all adhere to the requested
practices and thus would not be put at a relative competitive disadvantage. Last August the Seventh Circuit upheld the Commission's finding of an unlawful agreement.
Music Distributors.The Commission entered into consent agreements with the five largest distributors of
prerecorded music, who together account for 85 percent
of industry sales, for using cooperative advertising programs that imposed unreasonable price restrictions on
retailers and resulted in higher prices for consumers.
Known as "minimum advertised price" (MAP) programs, they were intended to squelch discount music
retailing, and, in turn, relieve pressures on the distributors' margins and enable them to raise their own prices.
I'll first describe how the MAP programs worked, and
then comment on why they were anticompetitive. The
MAP programs required retailers to advertise CDs at or
above the MAP set by the distributor in order to qualify
for substantial cooperative advertising payments. The
respondents used a very broad definition of advertising,
defining it as everything except the price sticker on the
CD. To discourage retailers from selling below the manu338
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facturers' desired price levels, the manufacturers withheld promotional funds from retailers who advertised
sales prices below the desired levels, even when the
stores used their own advertising money rather than the
manufacturers' cooperative advertising funds. A large
retailer could lose millions in cooperative advertising
funds each year if it did not comply.
Several factors led to the conclusion that these
MAP programs could not pass muster under a rule of
reason test. First, the programs were intended to stabilize
retail prices and relieve pressures on distributors' margins, and they achieved those objectives. Although the
programs did not actually prohibit retailers from selling
below the MAP price, the MAP program prevented
retailers from effectively communicating discounts to
consumers. Retailers therefore had little incentive to
employ a competitive strategy of actually selling products at a discount. Further, given the highly concentrated
industry, the stabilizing effect of the MAP programs
increased the risk of collusion or interdependent conduct.
The Commission therefore found reason to believe that
these restraints violated the antitrust laws in two respects. First, when considered together, the MAP programs constituted practices that facilitated horizontal
collusion among the distributors. Second, when viewed
individually, each distributor's MAP arrangement constituted an unreasonable vertical restraint of trade. Agency
staff estimated that U.S. consumers paid substantially
more for CDs than they otherwise would have over the
past three years.
The five distributors agreed to a consent order that
prohibits them from linking any promotional funds to the
advertised prices of their retail customers for the next
seven years, and for 13 years after that, the companies
would be prohibited from conditioning promotional
money on the prices contained in advertisements they do
not pay for. The order also prohibits the companies from
terminating relationships with any retailer based on that
retailer's prices.
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Supermarket Mergers. This is another priority for us. The
industry is continuing to undergo substantial consolidation, and it is important to examine these mergers very
closely to ensure that consumers do not suffer from a loss
of competition at the grocery checkout counter. The past
year was no exception; we had three enforcement actions.
First, as previously noted, Kroger's proposed acquisition
of 74 Winn-Dixie supermarkets in Texas and Oklahoma
was abandoned after the FTC filed an injunction action.
Second, the proposed $3.6 billion consolidation of Food
Lion and Hannaford raised competitive concerns in local
markets in Virginia and North Carolina. The transaction
was allowed to go forward only after the Commission
secured a consent agreement that required the divestiture
of 37 supermarkets needed to maintain competition in
those markets.
Third, the proposed acquisition of 72 Jitney-Jungle
and Delchamps stores by Winn-Dixie raised serious
concerns in various local markets in Florida and Mississippi. The unique aspect of this case is that the transaction had been approved by a Bankruptcy Court. The
transaction obviously involved failing firm issues, and
the key question was whether Jitney-Jungle had made
good-faith efforts to elicit reasonable alternative offers for
the stores. For the most part Jitney-Jungle was not successful in obtaining reasonable alternative bids, but in
four markets there were alternative purchasers that did
not pose competitive problems. Those four markets did
not qualify for the failing firm defense, and the Commission challenged the acquisition in those four markets.
Winn-Dixie agreed to a consent order that precludes the
company for a period of ten years from acquiring the
four Jitney-Jungle stores located in the four relevant
geographic markets, as well as any other supermarkets in
designated areas.
The important aspect of the transaction was how
quickly we conducted and concluded our review. Because of the posture in bankruptcy we completed our
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merger review and issued an order in just over one
month. We recognize the need for expediency in the
bankruptcy context and endeavor to complete these
investigation as expeditiously as possible.
Let me mention one other issue regarding supermarket mergers: whether the Commission has a preference for an individual type of buyer by size - large or
small firm. The record shows there is no Commission
preference for any type of buyer. The Commission's
approach to supermarket divestitures has not precluded
smaller or local grocery stores from participating as
buyers because it believes that effective competitors come
in all shapes and sizes. In addition, the Commission is
sensitive to the fact that small supermarket chains often
offer greater product variety and choice than other supermarkets - witnesses testified to that important dimension
of competition in our recent Slotting Allowances workshop. Over the past five years the Commission issued 14
orders that required divestitures of 317 supermarkets. Of
the 317 stores, 124 have been purchased by independents,
whereas only 73 have been purchased by large chains.
The remaining 120 were sold to small regional chains. As
these statistics confirm, the Commission neither favors
nor disfavors any particular category of purchaser. The
ultimate objective of the Commission's process is for the
divested assets to be sold to a firm that can fully restore
the competitive situation prior to the merger.
Before leaving the supermarket aisles, I want to
mention our innovative approach to the issue of slotting
allowances. Slotting allowances are typically lump-sum,
up-front payments by food manufacturers to have their
products placed on supermarket shelves. Although this is
a controversial practice, there is relatively little public
information on it. To enhance transparency and begin a
dialogue on the legal and economic issues on the subject,
the Commission held a two-day public workshop on the
subject to learn more about the nature and function of
these allowances and related marketing practices such as
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pay-to-stay arrangements and exclusivity agreements,
drawing on the experiences and insights of food suppliers, retailers, academics, antitrust practitioners, and
economists. A staff report ("Report on the Federal Trade
Commission Workshop on Slotting Allowances and
Other Marketing Practices in the Grocery Industry") was
issued in February, 2001. The staff concluded that slotting
fees and related practices such as pay-to-stay fees and
exclusive dealing arrangements should be analyzed
under the usual antitrust standards for exclusionary
conduct, and the report sets forth a framework for analyzing such conduct. The report concludes with a set of
recommendations for future examination of practices in
this area, including empirical study of slotting arrangements, careful review of exclusive dealing contracts, and
attentiveness to possible monopsony concerns in supermarket mergers.
ConsumerProducts.Various consumer products industries are also undergoing considerable consolidation. In
the past year, two transactions raised major competitive
concerns. I have already mentioned the Heinz/BeechNut merger involving prepared baby food. The acquisition of Nabisco Holdings Corp. by Philip Morris created
the world's largest food company, with over $100 billion
in food sales. The transaction raised serious concerns in
five highly concentrated markets with combined industry sales of almost $750 million - dry-mix gelatin desserts,
dry-mix puddings, dry-mix no-bake desserts, and baking
power. The parties agreed to divest Nabisco's businesses
in these markets in order to preserve competition.
D. Media Mergers
AOL/Time Warner. America On Line's acquisition of
Time Warner was one of the most closely watched transactions of the year. The proposed merger of these two
giants in consumer communications and media carried
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the prospect of major structural change in several industries. It appeared that the merged firm might be able to
gain dominance in three markets. The first of these is
broadband Internet access services. AOL is the dominant
narrowband ISP, and it is well positioned to become a
significant broadband ISP as well. Time Warner already
provides broadband Internet access through its Road
Runner service. The marriage of the two firms could
substantially lessen competition in this market by dominating broadband Internet access over Time Warner's
cable systems.2 9 The second market that was in potential
jeopardy was residential broadband Internet transport
services. The two most common forms of residential
broadband access today are cable and DSL. Before the
merger, DSL was the principal means of broadband AOL
access, but the merger would reduce AOUs incentives to
market and promote broadband access via DSL. Given
AOL's overwhelming popularity as an Internet service
provider, the merged firm could use that advantage to
favor Time Warner's cable system over DSL transport for
AOL access. The third market involves interactive television services ("ITV"). AOL recently launched AOL TV,a
first generation ITV service, and is well positioned to
become the leading ITV provider. Since cable television
lines have distinct competitive advantages over DSL in
providing ITV services, the merged firm would have the
ability as well as an incentive to prevent or deter rival
ITV providers from competing with AOUs ITV service.
After a comprehensive investigation, the Commission imposed strict conditions before permitting the
merger. The merged firm was required to open its cable
systems to competing ISPs, prohibited from discriminating on the basis of affiliation in the transmission of content, and prohibited from discriminating in AOLs DSL
subscriber fees in favor of Internet access via Time
Warner's cable system. The Commission's order thus
protects consumers from higher prices and reduced
product quality, and ensures that consumers have a
reasonable range of choices in the marketplace.
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Time-Warner/EMI. The Bureau also took a very close
look at a proposed joint venture between Time Warner
and EMI plc, which would have combined two of the five
major recorded music companies and the two largest
music publishing companies in the United States and the
world. Both of the companies control multiple record
labels that span a number of different musical genres.
Their businesses involve a full range of activities in the
recorded music business, including "label" functions,
which involve discovering artists, working with artists to
produce records, and releasing, promoting and marketing those records, as well as distributor functions, which
consist of manufacturing, warehousing, sales and marketing, and distribution.
The transaction presented concerns over both
unilateral and coordination effects. Obviously, recorded
music and music publishing are differentiated products,
which suggests that the joint venture could selectively
raise prices for certain recordings and published songs.
Our concerns were heightened because there appeared to
be some possibility that a previous acquisition in the
record industry had been followed by unilateral price
increases by the merged firm.
As significant, if not more so, were our concerns
that the merger would enhance coordinated interaction
in the highly concentrated recorded music market. Structurally this is a tight oligopoly, with a history of price
coordination, and formidable impediments to entry.
These structural concerns were reinforced by our separate investigation of the industry's use of minimum
advertised price (MAP) programs. As discussed above,
our investigation indicated that these MAP programs
were likely to facilitate coordinated behavior. The MAP
case illustrates that the industry can coordinate on general competitive practices, such as cooperative advertising, even though product differentiation may complicate
price coordination on particular products. Although the
Commission's consent order put an end to that particular
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practice, the industry has faced collusion charges in a
number of other cases, some of which resulted in substantial fines or settlements. In addition, the evidence
indicated that substantial amounts of competitively
sensitive information are accessible by firms in the industry.
We looked at entry conditions, of course, and it
appeared that entry or expansion by small recording
companies or distributors was not likely to be sufficient
to defeat an anticompetitive price increase. The smaller
firms generally serve special segments of the industry,
and do not compete head-on with the mainstream music
companies. Unlike the five major record companies, these
small independent record labels do not have the breadth
of genres, the established artists and catalog, nor the
wholly-owned distribution companies to support their
efforts. Further, some of the independents labels depend
on the five major record firms for distribution.
We also looked at the likely impact of technological change such as digital distribution via sites like
Napster. These forms of Internet music distribution
appeared to have little impact on conventional music
distribution, and in any event, the majors are involved in
several of the Internet distribution ventures as well. For
example, Bertelsmann Music Group, which has recently
formed an alliance with Napster, is working on a fee for
service model for Napster and is reported to have invited
the other major record companies to work with them.
The AOL/Time Warner transaction also had
implications for the analysis of the Time Warner/EMI
joint venture, because of the combination of AOUs leading position in Internet access, Time-Warner's substantial
position in broadband Internet delivery, and TimeWarner's recorded music library and music publishing
holdings. The AOL merger made Time-Warner a substantial potential player in Internet music distribution, and
with control of both Time Warner and EMI music content, AOL could have been in a position to favor Time
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Warner/EMI content at the expense of other record and
Internet sites. In the end, Time Warner and EMI have
abandoned their proposed joint venture.
E. A Note on Transparency: Some Matters We Didn't
Challenge
We periodically hear from the private bar a desire
that we address investigations in which we decide not to
bring enforcement actions. Our ability to do that is limited by considerations of confidentiality, but today I am
able to address two recent matters in which we chose not
to go forward.3 °
BASFIChemdal. Last year we investigated BASF AG's
proposed acquisition of the super absorbent polymer
business of Chemdal Corporation from Amcol International Corporation. Chemdal and BASF were direct
competitors in super absorbent polymers ("SAP"), virtually all of which is used to make diapers absorbent. In the
United States there are five SAP manufacturers and this
case turned on the definition of geographic market. In a
U.S. market the merger would have resulted in a guidelines violation but in a world market the concentration
levels were significantly lower. At first, there was a serious question about whether a world market was defensible since the level of imports was rather small, typically
no more than a few percent per year. However, there
were several reasons to believe that SAP imports could
increase in response to a price increase. First, SAP is not a
perishable commodity and it is easily shipped from Asia
in one-ton "supersacks." The cost of shipment from Asia
did not substantially increase the cost of the product and
thus customers could turn to Asian imports without a
significant effect on their underlying cost. Second, there
is substantial overcapacity of SAP in Asia. The difference
between Asian pricing and U.S. pricing was relatively
close. In addition, there was evidence that current com-
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petitors had to cut costs in the past in response to bids
from Asian suppliers. Based on each of these factors we
concluded that a worldwide market was appropriate.
Glaxo Wellcome/SmithKline Beecham. I mentioned the
consent agreement in the Glaxo Wellcome/SmithKline
Beecham merger, but there was one market where we
decided enforcement action was not appropriate - drugs
for smoking cessation. The issue posed was whether the
relevant product market consisted of both over-thecounter ("OTC") and prescription drugs. SmithKline
markets the two leading OTC smoking cessation products, Nicoderm CQ transdermal nicotine patch and
Nicorette nicotine gum, while Glaxo markets Zyban, the
leading prescription product for quitting smoking. The
smoking cessation products of SB and Glaxo comprise
the vast majority of all smoking cessation products in this
market with over $700 million in sales. Although the
Commission typically excludes OTC drugs from prescription drug markets, in this case defining a relevant
market was a close question. The Commission continued
the investigation during the public comment period to
resolve the issue.
As in past cases, in this case, several factors favored the traditional analysis of keeping the markets
separate: Glaxo's Zyban requires a visit to a doctor (although evidence did indicate that demand for Zyban is
generated by consumers) while Nicorette and Nicoderm
CQ do not; the channels established for the distribution
of OTC products are separate from those for prescription
drugs; consumers may compare the price and quality of
Nicoderm CQ and Nicorette with private label patches
and gum (that comprise most of the remainder of the
OTC smoking cessation market) at the drugstore and
grocery shelf while patients who choose Zyban are removed from any pricing decisions; and the side effects
and mechanism of action of an oral prescription pill are
far different than those of OTC nicotine replacement
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products designed to deliver the nicotine to which the
smoker is already addicted.
Despite the presence of these factors, however, a
combination of recent changes in the marketing of prescription drugs, as well as the fact that the products of
both companies comprise the vast majority of all smoking cessation products on the market, led the staff to
examine more closely the question of whether Glaxo's
Zyban and SB's Nicoderm and Nicorette constrained
each other's pricing. The lifting of prohibitions on directto-consumer ("DTC") advertising of prescription drugs
has produced big changes in the marketing of pharmaceuticals - we've all noticed the proliferation of television
and print advertisements of prescription drugs. Glaxo's
Zyban is a prime example of a prescription drug that is
heavily promoted to consumers. The advertisements for
Zyban and the OTC products appear to make competing
claims - Zyban's advertisements always assert that Zyban
is the nicotine-free way to quit smoking, and some advertisements for Nicorette and Nicoderm tell the viewer that
one need not visit a physician to try them.
After extensive analysis, we concluded that although Zyban and SB's Nicoderm patch and Nicorette
gum target similar consumers, Zyban does not constrain
the pricing of SB's OTC products, and they do not affect
the pricing of Zyban. Other characteristics of the particular smoking cessation product, as well as the unique
smoking characteristics of each smoker influence the
manner by which people will attempt to quit far more
than price.

VI. International Activities
As economies across the globe continue to become
increasingly interconnected, so have our interactions
with competition authorities around the world.
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Bilateral cooperation. The FTC cooperates routinely with
many foreign antitrust agencies to enforce the antitrust
laws in cases in which the parties and the effects of their
conduct may be subject to scrutiny in foreign countries as
well as in the United States. For example, in recent
transnational mergers such as AOL/Time-Warner, TimeWarner/EMI, Boeing/Hughes, Exxon/Mobil, and
AstraZeneca/Novartis, our staff worked closely with that
of the European Commission and other foreign antitrust
authorities to coordinate our analysis and approach to
remedies. We also work with foreign antitrust agencies
on nonmerger investigations such as Covisint, where we
worked with Germany and other foreign authorities. This
produces substantial benefits, both in particular cases
and in fostering substantive and procedural convergence.
Along with the Department of Justice, the Commission has formalized our cooperative relationships by
entering into inter-governmental agreements, including,
most recently, a cooperation agreement with Mexico in
July 2000. We hope to enter into an enhanced agreement
on positive comity with Canada, along the lines of our
1998 agreement with the European Community, in the
near future. FTC, DOJ, and the European Commission
staff also participate in a Mergers Working Group to
pursue further convergence - the Working Group has
already made progress in the area of remedies, and will
be exploring other subjects in the coming year.
International Fora. The Commission participates in
international organizations, such as the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the
World Trade Organization (WTO), the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC), to promote competition
policies and enforcement practices that can benefit all
member countries and are consistent with the goals of
maintaining competition and open markets and enhancing consumer welfare. We are also exploring ways in
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which the proposed Global Competition Initiative
("GCI") can deal with the challenges that continuing
globalization poses for competition policy. 31 We participate in the Negotiating Group on Competition Policy in
the Free Trade Area of the Americas negotiation which is
considering the role of competition policy in a hemispheric free trade agreement, and are involved in negotiating possible competition provisions in new Free Trade
Agreements with Singapore and Chile.

VII. Conclusion
In summary, it has been another challenging year
for antitrust enforcement at the FTC, in terms of the
number of cases we litigated, the substantial settlements
we achieved in other cases, and the substantive issues we
addressed in a variety of contexts. I believe the competition mission at the FTC has well served consumers,
competition, and the marketplace.
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